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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
INSURANCE -

PRoIBTI

A.RnIES WAmNTY -

FoRFrr-

URE OF FrE PoLicy. - A policy of insurance contained a "prohibited articles warranty",' providing that the insurer should not
be liable for loss while gasoline was kept on the premises, but a
rider attached to the policy permitted the use of gasoline for the
purpose of bottling automobile oils and other purposes not more
hazardous. At the time of a fire the premises were occupied by a
tenant who was using gasoline while engaged in the illegal manufacture of intoxicating liquors. The Supreme Court of the United
States held that the insured could not recover on the policy if the
warranty was violated by his tenant, notwithstanding the fact that
the insured had no knowledge of such violation. St. Paul Fire and
Marine Insurance Co. v. Bachmann.
The theory of the cases is that a violation of a prohibited
articles warranty by a tenant, or by one on the premises with the
consent of the insured, is a violation of the insured himself.' The
lessor engages that a certain thing shall not be done and it is his
business to see that his tenants do not violate the conditions of the
policy.' It may be stated as a general rule that the fact that the
presence of the prohibited article on the premises is unknown to
the insured does not excuse the breach.? Two jurisdictions, however, Massachusetts and Texas, follow a view contrary to the doctrine of the Bachmann case. It is there held that a. landlord who
uses reasonable care in the selection of his tenants will not have
his insurance forfeited by their acts.!
It is necessary to distinguish prohibited articles warranties
from so-called increase of hazard warranties. In the latter it is
generally implied that the increased hazard must be one within
the knowledge of the insured,' and even then, the policy is susIThe typical wording of such a warranty is that a stated article "shall not
be kept, used, or allowed on the premises."
252 S. Ct. 270 (1932). The Court remanded the case for another trial after
reversing a judgment for the plaintiff in order that a jury might find whether
the operation of a moonshine still was more hazardous than the business of
bottling automobile oils. If such was the case, the presence of the gasoline
constituted a violation of the warranty.
aLiverpool and London Ins. Co. v. Gunther, 116 U. S. 113, 128, 129, 6 S.
Ct. 306 (1885); German Fire Insurance Co. v. Board of Commissioners of
Shawnee County, 54-Kan. 732, 39 Pac. 697 (1895); Gunther v. Liverpool and
London and Globe Ins. Co., 134 U. S. 110, 116, 10 S. Ct. 448 (1890).
'Kelley v. Worcester Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 97 Mass. 284, 287 (1867) ; Fire
Association v. Williamson, 26 Pa. St. 196, 198 (1856).
rDuncan v. Sun Fire Ins. Co., 6 Wend 487 (N. Y. 1831); See 2 COOLEY,
BRIEFs ON THE LAw OF INsURANCE (1905) 1710.

0White v. Mutual Fire Assur. Co., 8 Gray 566 (Mass. 1857); East Texas
Fire Ins. Co. v. Kempner, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 533, 34 S. W. 393 (1890).
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pended only while the increase of hazard lasts,' whereas in the
former class of warranties the policy is ipso facto forfeited by a
single breach.'
Prohibited articles warranties are construed to prohibit the
habitualuse of such articles, and not their exceptional use as upon
some emergency. The prohibited article must be kept on the
premises with some degree of permanency.' Consequently, under
this qualification of the doctrine it was held in Farmers' Bank v.
Tri-State Mutual Grain Dealers' Fire Ins. Co." that the insured
did not violate a clause prohibiting "keeping, using, or allowing
gasoline on the premises" by applying gasoline to the rusted parts
of machinery in the building. Nor will the use of gasoline in burning off old paint breach such a warranty." Another ease goes so
far as to permit a small amount of gasoline to be kept on the
premises to be used in connection with the business conducted
thereon if the gasoline has not caused the fire." But where the
insured for several months kept his Ford ear with its gasoline
tank one-third full in the building, the policy was forfeited, though
the car was not in the building at the time of the fire. "' In summary, it may be said that a prohibited articles warranty, whenever possible, will be construed to require a condition of some
duration before there will be a breach. A case apparently out of
line with the above decisions is one holding that where the Grand
Army of the Republic held a reunion on the plaintiff's premises
and gasoline was used by members, the plaintiff could not recover
on the policy.'
Though he never consented to the use of his
premises by the Army, the Court considered knowledge of occupancy and acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff as sufficient
to bind him.
There is a line of authority decidedly favorable to the insured, which, though purporting to follow the doctrine that a prohibited articles warranty may be violated irrespective of the in'St.

Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Bachmann, aupra n. 2.
3 Insurance Co. of North America v. McDowell, 50 Ill.
120 (1869).
* Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U. S. 452, 14 S. Ct. 379 (1894).

"Sandersville Oil Mill Co. v. Globe and Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 32 Ga. App.

722, 124 S. E. 728 (1924).
"41 S. D. 398, 170 N. W. 638 (1919).
'Lebanon County v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 237 Pa. 360,
85 Atl. 419, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 148 (1912).
sMcLure v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 242 Pa. 59, 88 Atl. 921, 48 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 1221 (1913).
M organ v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 104 Kan. 383, 179 Pac. 330 (1919).
"5Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Board of Com rs of Shawnee County, supra n. 3.
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sured's knowledge of the breach, holds that the warranty is not
violated by the act of the third person if such act is not under the
control of the insured, and the insured has taken reasonable precautions to prevent the act. 6 Where a policy contained a strict
prohibition against smoking in or about the building, and third
parties by permission on the premises did smoke, the insurance
company is nevertheless liable if the insured took reasonable precautions to prevent it." An employee of the insured carried a can
of gasoline on the premises with an avowed purpose to burn the
house, and it was so used without the insured's knowledge or complicity. Such an act was held not a "keeping, using, or allowing
gasoline on the premises" within the meaning of the policy.'
-AUGUST W. PETROPLUS.

ToRTs -

LIABILITY IN DAmAGEs FOR OBTAINING ANNULMENT
H had his marriage with W annulled
because no decree of W's divorce from her first husband in Kentucky appeared on the records there. By fraud H prevented W's
appearance in the annulment proceeding and a decree was granted
H by default, but H continued to live with W, concealing the annulment from her until his remarriage with G. The Kentucky
court thereafter entered a nuno pro tunc order, dissolving W's
first marriage as of the date prior to her marriage with H. W
sued H in chancery to vacate the annulment decree;' and though
W was awarded costs, the court refused to vacate the decree because of the intervention of the rights of G, an innocent third
party.2 Now W sues H at law for damages caused by his fraud
in securing the annulment and in actively concealing this fact
until his remarriage, which barred her subsequent suit to vacate
the decree. On demurrer the majority of the court decided the
declaration set out an actionable wrong which arose after the
cessation of coverture. Cameron v. Cameron.8
The weight of authority refuses to permit husband and wife
OF MARRIAGE BY FRAUD. -

1Aurora Fire Ins. Co. v. Eddy, 55 Ill. 213 (1870).
17bj

Queen Ins. Co. v. Van Giesen, 136 Ga. 741, 72 S. E. 41 (1911).
1105 W. Va. 621, 143 S. E. 349 (1928).
2
107 W. Va. 655, 150 S. E. 225 (1929).
8162 S. E. 173 (W. Va. 1932), Hatcher and Lively, JJ., dissenting.
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